Avoidance in Nonpayment Situations and Fundamental Breach Under the 1980 U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods by Clausson, Olof
NYLS Journal of International and
Comparative Law
Volume 6
Number 1 Volume 6, No. 1, 1984 Article 4
1984
Avoidance in Nonpayment Situations and
Fundamental Breach Under the 1980 U.N.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods
Olof Clausson
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/
journal_of_international_and_comparative_law
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYLS Journal of International
and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
Clausson, Olof (1984) "Avoidance in Nonpayment Situations and Fundamental Breach Under the 1980 U.N. Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods," NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law: Vol. 6 : No. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol6/iss1/4
AVOIDANCE IN NONPAYMENT SITUATIONS AND
FUNDAMENTAL BREACH UNDER THE 1980 U.N.




The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods' (the Convention) provides, as a general rule, that a
party may avoid or terminate a contract only in response to a "funda-
mental breach" by the other party to the contract.2 The Convention
defines fundamental breach in article 25.8 This article identifies guide-
lines for determining when a buyer's nonpayment amounts to a funda-
mental breach entitling the seller to avoid the contract. The basic pre-
mise upon which this analysis rests is that only substantive law can
give meaning to a theoretical concept such as fundamental breach.
Initially, to provide a general understanding of the rule, a histori-
cal overview of its development at the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 4 will be provided. Article 258
will then be compared with its counterpart in the Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods (ULIS). s
* LL.B., Stockholm University, 1981; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania, 1984. The
author is currently associated with the firm of Carl Swartling, Advokatbyra in Stock-
holm, Sweden.
1. Final Act of The United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (the Convention), U.N. CONF. ON CONT. FOR THE INT'L SALE OF
GOODS-OFFcIAL RECS., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/19 (1981), [hereinafter cited as OFFICIAL
REcoaRsi. The Convention is reprinted in 19 I.L.M. M (1990).
2. Id. arts. 49 (1)(a), 64 (1)(a).
3. Id. art. 25.
4. See infra notes 8-24 and accompanying text. For a more comprehensive under-
standing of the history and goals of the Convention, see OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1,
at 230. The Official Records comprise the documents reviewed at and generated by the
Conference. Included among these materials are prior drafts of the Convention, the Sec-
retary General's appraisal of the penultimate draft, the comments of governments and
internal organizations on various drafts, amendments proposed at the Conference and
committee reports. See also Farnsworth, The Vienna Convention: History and Scope, 18
INT'L LAW. 17, 17-19 (1984).
5. Convention, supra note 1, art. 25.
6. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 834
U.N.T.S. 107 (1972), reprinted in 3 I.L.M. 854 (1964). [hereinafter cited as ULIS].
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L.
Since no case law interpreting article 25 of the Convention exists,
other less authoritative sources must be examined. Hence, statutes and
decisions prescribing commercial law in England, the United States
and Sweden, which maintain the basic rule that not every breach of
contract is enough to give an aggrieved party the right to avoid a con-
tract, will be appraised. From this study it may be possible to derive
guidelines pertaining to the definition of fundamental breach in article
25 of the Convention and its application.
Since the Convention gives legal effect to commercial usages, the
manner in which international traders have developed the concept of
fundamental breach will then be examined. For example, standard con-
tracts used in international trade usually indicate a time period for a
reasonable delay in payment, and this period differs with the type of
transaction and the goods involved. Thus, these contracts may also
prove helpful in determining how the definition of fundamental breach
in article 25 will develop and be applied in practice.
I. THE CONVENTION
A. Avoidance:7 Fundamental Breach
In a sales contract governed by the Convention, the buyer is obli-
gated to pay the price and to take delivery.8 Since the parties may
deviate from the Convention's provisions,' the contract itself may im-
7. Avoidance in installment contracts is not discussed herein. But see Convention,
supra note 1, art. 73, which reads:
(1) In the case of a contract for delivery of goods by instalments, if the
failure of one party to perform any of his obligations in respect of any instal-
ment constitutes a fundamental breach of contract with respect to that instal-
ment, the other party may declare the contract avoided with respect to that
instalment.
(2) If one party's failure to peform any of his obligations in respect of any
instalment gives the other party good grounds to conclude that a fundamental
breach of contract will occur with respect to future instalments, he may declare
the contract avoided for the future, provided that he does so within a reasonable
time.
(3) A buyer who declares the contract avoided in respect of any delivery
may, at the same time, declare it avoided in respect of deliveries already made or
of future deliveries if, by reason of their interdependence, those deliveries could
not be used for the purpose contemplated by the parties at the time of the con-
clusion of the contract.
Id.
It is to be noted that this article bears a strong resemblance, both in form and sub-
stance, to § 2-612 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
8. Convention, supra note 1, art. 53.
9. Id. art. 6.
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pose additional obligations upon the buyer. In the case of a buyer's
breach of any of his obligations, the Convention provides the seller
with an assortment of remedies."0
Under article 64 the seller may, under certain circumstances, de-
clare the contract "avoided;"' 1 i.e., the seller may cancel or terminate
the contract, or may be discharged from further obligations under the
contract." Not every breach, however, entitles the seller to avoid the
contract.'" As a general rule, the breach must amount to a "fundamen-
tal breach" of contract.' 4
Article 25 provides a definition of fundamental breach:
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is funda-
mental if it results in such detriment to the other party as sub-
stantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under
the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a
reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances
would not have foreseen such a result.1 5
Over the years, the international sales law's definition of funda-
10. Id. arts. 61-65.
11. Id. art. 64. Article 64 provides in part:
(1) The seller may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the failure by the
buyer to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention
amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; or (b) if the buyer does not,
within the additional period of time fixed by the seller in accordance with para-
graph (1) of article 63, perform his obligation to pay the price or take delivery of
the goods, or if he declares that he will not do so within the period so fixed.
Id.
12. Other terms describing the same effect are rescission, repudiation and the setting
aside of the contract. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS §§ 21-22 (2d ed.
1978).
13. Convention, supra note 1, art. 64(2). Article 64(2) states in part: "in cases where
the buyer has paid the price, the seller loses the right to declare the contract
avoided .. " Id.
14. Id. art. 64 (1)(a). The Convention incorporated what seems to be an exception to
this general rule adapted from German law. Id. art. 64(1)(b). In the event of a delay in
the performance of an obligation, the aggrieved, waiting obligee may notify the delin-
quent obligor that he must perform within a specified reasonable time period. If the
delaying obligor does not comply with the Nachfrist ("or else") notice, the obligee is
entitled to avoid the contract, notwithstanding the delaying obligor's failure to fulfill the
requisites for fundamental breach in article 25. Id. See Honnold, The New Uniform Law
for International Sales and the UCC: A Comparison, 18 INT'L LAw 27-28 (1984).
Even though the Nachfrist provision in article 64 (1)(b) appears to state an excep-
tion to the general rule, one would hope that international merchants would regularly
exploit this provision. If so, litigation as to whether a breach is fundamental will arise
with less frequency.
15. Id. art. 25.
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mental breach has been modified a number of times. The 1964 Hague
Convention on Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, sec-
tion 10, defined a breach as "wherever a party in breach knew, or
ought to have known, at the time of the conclusion of the contract,
that a reasonable person in the same situation as the other party would
not have entered into the contract if he had foreseen the breach and its
effects."'" This definition was highly criticized; 17 especially its "subjec-
tive" requisites, which were viewed as causing problems in its
application:'8
The effect of the Article is that it depends on the actual or
required knowledge on the part of the party in breach at the
time of the conclusion of the contract, whether a breach is fun-
damental or not, but this knowledge refers in part to a hypo-
thetical situation of fact prevailing partly at the time of the
breach, i.e., the breach itself and its effect. 19
Another commentator stated: "Analysis of this provision in UNCI-
TRAL made it clear that 'fundamental breach' must be redefined in
terms of the materiality of the breach."' 0
Article 25 of the Convention sets up three criteria to assist in de-
fining "fundamental breach." First, the breach must result in a detri-
ment to the innocent party; second, it must substantially deprive the
innocent party of what he is entitled to expect under the contract; and
third, the result must have been foreseeable.2 ' These are objective cri-
teria. The objective approach is evident in the second requisite's refer-
ence to what the innocent party is "entitled" to expect and in the third
requisite's incorporation of the "reasonable person" test.12
As previously mentioned, the definition of fundamental breach has
undergone substantial change over the years during the development
of an international sales law. A number of scholars have scrutinized
16. ULIS, supra note 6, art. 10.
17. See supra note 4.
18. Conversely, Huber labels article 25 a failure, "sie ist nichtssagend and Oiberdies
missverstindlich." Huber, Der Uncitral-Entwurf eines Uberinkommens iber internatio-
nale Warenkaufvertrdge, 43 RABELS ZErrsCHRIFr FOR AUSL.NDISCHES UND INTERNATION-
ALES PRIVATRECHT 462 (1969).
19. R.H. GRAVESON, THE UNIFORM LAWS OF INTERNATIONAL SALES AcT (1967): A COM-
MENTARY 55 (1968).
20. J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION 212 (1982).
21. Convention, supra note 1, art. 25. In order to avoid the contract, however, notice
must be given to the other party. Id. art. 26. This is a change from the ULIS and a
rejection of ipso facto avoidance. See supra note 6.
22. Id.
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each definition in an attempt to determine which one most accurately
reflects the concept's application in practice.2s The prevailing view re-
mains that judges have not yet articulated a principled standard for
determining what constitutes a fundamental breach:
Only practice has been able to define [the] meaning with rea-
sonable certainty over the decades. In applying [the] concept
the judge forms an opinion, taking all circumstances into con-
sideration whether the breach of contract is so significant as to
justify avoidance or not. If it is, he then comes to the conclu-
sion that the statutory definition has been fulfilled; otherwise,
that it has not. In other words, he does not form his conclusion
through confronting the facts and the statutory text. He re-
sorts to the statutory text merely to support his already ex-
isting instinctive conclusion. 4
If we accept this view, it may be advisable to study the interpreta-
tion of similar provisions in national legal systems, bearing in mind the
international character of the sales convention and other limitations on
the authoritativeness of these sources.
B. Payment of the Price
Before commencing this analysis, a few words regarding the
buyer's obligation to pay the price are appropriate. Article 5825 estab-
lishes when the buyer must pay for the goods. If a date is not agreed
upon in the contract, the buyer generally must pay when the seller ten-
23. One scholar views the doctrine of fundamental breach of contract in terms of a
method of escape from the most carefully drafted exemption clauses. He claims the cases
seem to establish that no matter how extensive an exemption clause might be, it could
not exclude liability in respect of the breach of a fundamental term or of a fundamental
breach. See A. GUEST, ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 149 (26th ed. 1984).
24. Eorsi, A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 31 AM. J. Comp. L 333, 336 (1983).
25. Convention, supra note 1. Article 58 reads:
(1) If the buyer is not bound to pay the price at any other specific time, he
must pay it when the seller places either the goods or documents controlling
their disposition at the buyer's disposal in accordance with the contract and this
Convention. The seller may make such payment a condition for handing over the
goods or documents. (2) If the contract involves carriage of the goods, the seller
may dispatch the goods on terms whereby the goods, or documents controlling
their disposition, will not be handed over to the buyer except against payment of
the price. (3) The buyer is not bound to pay the price until he has had an oppor-
tunity to examine the goods, unless the procedures for delivery or payment
agreed upon by the parties are inconsistent with his having such an opportunity.
19841
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ders either the goods or the documents controlling the goods.2" The
buyer's obligation to pay the price includes compliance with the terms
concerning the manner of payment,27 e.g., the issuance of a letter of
credit,"" or the establishment of a banker's acceptance. 9
II. ENGLISH LAW
Under English law the seller's right to avoids the contract due to
the buyer's failure to pay the price arises in two types of cases. The
first, which is not dealt with here, involves the buyer's repudiation of
the contract. 1 The second involves a breach amounting to a "funda-
mental breach."' The second group may be sub-categorized as follows:
26. Id. art. 58 (1).
27. Id. art. 58.
28. For an overview of the purposes and mechanics of establishing a letter of credit,
see P. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL BANKING 73-104 (3d ed. 1979). For general guidelines
concerning international letters of credit, see Uniform Customs and Practices for Docu-
mentary Credits, I.C.C. No. 400.
29. See generally P. OPPENHEIM, supra note 28, at 105-113.
30. See THE COMMON LAW LIBRARY, BENJAMIN'S SALES OF GOODS §§ 990-94 (2d ed.
1981); see also infra notes 33, 45 & 67.
31. Cf. Convention, supra note 1, art. 71. Article 71 provides:
(1) A party may suspend the performance of his obligations if, after the
conclusion of the contract, it becomes apparent that the other party will not
perform a substantial part of his obligations as a result of: (a) a serious defi-
ciency in his ability to perform or in his creditworthiness; or (b) his conduct in
preparing to perform or in performing the contract. (2) If the seller has already
dispatched the goods before the grounds described in the preceding paragraph
become evident, he may prevent the handing over of the goods to the buyer even
though the buyer holds a document which entitles him to obtain them. The pre-
sent paragraph relates only to the rights in the goods as between the buyer and
the seller. (3) A party suspending performance, whether before or after dispatch
of the goods, must immediately give notice of the suspension of the other party
and must continue with performance if the other party provides adequate assur-
ance of his performance.
Id.
32. The doctrine of fundamental breach in English law is confused:
The terminology of "fundamental breach" and "breach of a fundamental
term", which was originally adopted to deal with problems created by wide ex-
clusion clauses, has also been brought into service to determine whether a breach
of contract is sufficiently serious to justify the innocent party in treating himself
as discharged from further obligations under the contract.
HALSBURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND § 545 (Lord Hailsham ed. 1974). The House of Lords has
recently addressed the doctrine in connection with wide exemption clauses in Photo
Prod. v. Securicor Transp., [1980] 2 All E.R. 556. "Insofar as the doctrine survives the
Securicor case, it is therefore one of interpretation, that exemption clauses will not be
interpreted so as to cover fundamental breach of contract." BENJAMIN'S SALES OF GOODS
supra note 30, § 992.
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first, where the contract stipulates a right to terminate; second, where
the statute defines the right to terminate the contract; third, where
termination is a common law right; and fourth, where a right to termi-
nate arises as a result of the buyer's failure to comply with contract
provisions as to the method of payment.
A. Private, Statutory and Common Law Rights to Terminate
A contract may stipulate a right to terminate in the event of any
breach. In Mardorf Peach & Co., Ltd. v. Attica Sea Carriers Corpora-
tion of Liberia,"3 where such a clause was at issue, the court upheld the
obligee's right to rescind the contract upon the obligor's failure to
make timely installment payments.3 4 Further, the English Sale of
Goods Act provides: "[uinless a different intention appears from the
contract, stipulations as to time of payment are not deemed to be of
the essence of a contract of sale."35 The seller's right to resell the goods
is therefore limited to cases "where the buyer does not within a reason-
able time pay or tender the price.""0
Even if such is the case, the doctrine might still be applicable to determine whether
the breach justifies termination or not. In Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Mari-
time, S.A. v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale, [1966] 2 All E.R. 61, Lord Wilberforce
wrote:
For, though it may be true generally, if the contract contains a wide exemp-
tions clause, that a breach sufficiently serious to take the case outside the clause
will also give the other party the right to refuse further performance, it is not
the case, necessarily, that a breach of the latter character has the former conse-
quence. An act which apart from the exemptions clause, might be a breach suffi-
ciently serious to justify refusal or further performance, may be reduced in ef-
fect, or made not a breach at all, by the terms of the clause.
Id. at 91-92. Lord Reid stated to the contrary: "General use of the term 'fundamental
breach' is of most recent origin, and I can find nothing to indicate that it means either
more or less than the well known type of breach which entitles the innocent party to
treat it as repudiatory and to rescind the contract." Id. at 70.
33. [1977] 1 All E.R. 545.
34. Id. at 548.
35. Sale of Goods Act § 10(1) (1893). Section 10(1) provides:
Unless a different intention appears from the contract, stipulations as to
time of payment are not deemed to be of the essence of a contract of sale.
Whether any other stipulation as to time is of the essence of the contract or not
depends on the terms of the contract.
Id.
36. Id. § 48(3). This section states:
Where the goods are of a perishable nature, or where the unpaid seller gives
notice to the buyer of his intention to re-sell, and the buyer does not within a
reasonable time pay or tender the price, the unpaid seller may re-sell the goods
and recover from the original buyer damages for any loss occasioned by his
breach of contract.
19841
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These principles were applied in Ryan v. Ridley and Co., 7 where
the plaintiff sold a cargo of codfish to the defendant and payment was
to be made "by cash in exchange for" the bill of lading and insurance
policy. The cargo arrived by ship on October 24, 1901, and "soon"
thereafter the plaintiff tendered the shipping documents and requested
payment. The plaintiff, not having been paid by November 1, sold the
cargo a day or two later and sued to recover the loss caused by the
resale. In holding for the plaintiff, the court reasoned:
The words in the clause must be given their natural meaning,
and 'cash against documents' meant that when the documents
were tendered the cash must be ready. But a practical meaning
must be given to the words .... The clause meant that the
payment against the documents must be made within a reason-
able time-e.g., if the buyer said, 'You shall have a cheque to-
morrow morning,' that would be sufficient, or even a greater
delay would not be unreasonable if it would not affect the
rights of the parties. If ever there was a case in which the na-
ture of the cargo demanded promptitude, that of the cargo in
the present case did."'
Ryan illustrates that under the English Sale of Goods Act a failure by
the buyer to pay the price on the date stipulated is not per se a breach
entitling the seller to terminate the contract.39 The common law pro-
vided, "however, [that] a repeated failure to pay the price when the
seller demands payment on several occasions, would. . . it is submit-




37. [1902] 19 T.L.R. 45; 8 Com. Cas. 105.
38. Id. at 45-46.
39. Stipulations of time involving subjects other than payment are treated as being of
the essence of the contract. See Charles Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenheim, [1950] I K.B. 616;
Hartley v. Hymans [1920] 3 K.B. 475, 494-95; Crawford v. Toogood (1879) 13 Ch. D. 153
(As a condition of performance, time is of the essence in a contract for the sale of goods.
On the lapse of the stipulated time, if the buyer continues to press for delivery, he
waives his right to cancel the contract. The buyer then has a right to give notice fixing a
reasonable time for delivery, again making time of the essence. If this new stipulation is
not fulfilled the buyer may cancel the contract). Id.
40. BENJAMIN'S SALES OF GOODS, supra note 30, § 1445.
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B. Breach of the Terms of a Documentary Credit Clause
In international commerce it is common practice to have a docu-
mentary credit clause in a sales contract.41 These clauses obligate the
buyer to open a documentary credit in favor of the seller.2 Usually, no
time is specified for the furnishing of the documentary credit; 3 the
only time specified in the contract is the period of shipment."4 In these
instances, it is necessary to determine when the buyer was supposed to
open the documentary credit; only then can consideration be given as
to whether there was a breach entitling the seller to terminate the
contract.
This issue was raised in Pavia & Co., S.P.A. v. Thurmann-Niel-
sen,4 5 where, pursuant to a c.i.f. contract, 4" the plaintiff sold ground-
nuts for shipment from Brazil to Genoa, with delivery to be made in
February, March or April of 1949. Payment was to be made by letter of
credit in favor of the sellers and utilizable by them against delivery of
shipping documents.47 The buyers did not make the credit available
until April 22.48 The court held that in the absence of an express stipu-
lation in the contract, the credit should have been opened not when
the sellers were ready to ship the goods, but at the beginning of the
shipment period. Lord Denning stated the rationale for this holding as
follows:
The reason is because the seller is entitled, before he ships the
goods, to be assured that, on shipment, he will get paid. The
seller is not bound to tell the buyer the precise date when he is
going to ship, and whenever he does ship the goods he must be
able to draw on the credit. He may ship on the very first day of
the shipment period. If the buyer is to fulfill his Obligations, he
must, therefore, make the credit available to the seller at the
very first date when the goods may be lawfully shipped in com-
pliance with the contract.4"
The rule in Pavia & Co. was slightly reformulated, to the advan-
41. See generally id. §§ 2131-2294.
42. See id. § 2133.
43. See id. § 2167.
44. Id.
45. [1952] 1 All E.R. 492.
46. In a c.i.f. sales contract, the contract price includes in one lump sum the cost of
the goods as well as the insurance and freight costs to the given destination. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 220 (5th ed. 1979).
47. Pavia & Co., 1 All E.R. at 493.
48. Id. at 492.
49. Id. at 495.
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tage of the sellers, in Sinason-Teicher Inter-American Grain Corpora-
tion v. Oilcakes and Oilseeds Trading Co., Ltd.5 0 In Sinason-Teircher,
the c.i.f. contract called for shipment of barley during October or No-
vember 1952. Payment was to be net cash against documents, and the
buyers were to issue a guarantee to the sellers through their bank that
the documents would be taken up on first presentation. No date was
provided with respect to when this guarantee was to be furnished. The
court, in this case, adopted a rule which obligated the buyers to furnish
the guarantee within a reasonable time prior to the first date for ship-
ment. Before the first date for shipment, the seller cancelled the con-
tract on September 10, 1952, and therefore the sellers rather than the
buyers were liable.51
In Ian Stach, Ltd. v. Baker Bosley, Ltd.,52 the court rejected the
rule applied in Sinason-Teicher and found the rule laid down in Pavia
& Co. controlling." In Ian Stach, the plaintiff sold steel to the defend-
ant under a f.o.b. contract. Delivery was to be made in August or Sep-
tember 1956, and payment was to be made by letter of credit. 4 The
buyer had the right to select the date of shipment and also the respon-
sibility of making the arrangements for shipment.55 When the buyer
had not opened the letter of credit by August 14, the seller treated the
contract as repudiated and resold the goods.5 The buyer argued that
since he had the right to determine the date of shipment, the credit
had to be opened at a reasonable time before that date.' The court,
however, rejected this notion and held that the prima facie rule re-
quires opening of the credit, at the latest, by the earliest shipping
date.58
Hence, although no general rule can be cited as controlling the
time in which the buyer must comply with specifications of the method
of payment (i.e., the issuance of a letter of credit or the establishment
of a bank guarantee), compliance is required, at the latest, by the first
date of the shipping period. In some cases, however, this would not be
sufficient and compliance would have to be accomplished within a rea-
sonable time before the first date for shipment.59
50. [19541 3 All E.R. 468.
51. Id. at 472.
52. [1958] 2 Q.B. 130.
53. [1958] 1 All E.R. 547.
54. Id.




59. The argument could be made, however, that the Queen's Bench decision in Ian
Stach does not have any impact upon the decisions in the Court of Appeals. But see
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C. A Seller's Right to Rescind Under a Documentary Credit
Clause
With respect to c.i.f. contracts, Benjamin states: "The seller can
rescind if the buyer fails to comply with a requirement of the contract
to provide a bank guarantee for payment, or a confirmed credit," 0 and,
with respect to f.o.b. contracts: "[Tihe general rule is that any failure
of the buyer, unless waived, as to the time and place ... justifies rescis-
sion . . . .,, A literal reading of Benjamin's restatement of the rule
would imply that stricter compliance with the terms of a f.o.b. contract
is required. Thus, it may be inferred that the range of instances which
would trigger a seller's right to immediately rescind is broader under
f.o.b. contracts than it is under c.i.f. contracts since "any failure" enti-
tles the seller to rescind the contract. The case law, however, does not
appear to recognize this distinction, and it is doubtful whether Benja-
min intended such a literal interpretation."2
In Trans Trust S.P.R.L. v. Danubian Trading Co., Ltd.,"' the
seller sued for damages caused by the buyer's failure to establish a let-
ter of credit. Without reference to whether the contract was c.i.f. or
f.o.b., Lord Denning observed:
[T]he seller stipulates that the credit should be provided at a
specified time well in advance of the time for delivery of the
goods. What is the legal position of such a stipulation? Some-
times it is a condition precedent to the formation of a contract,
that is, it is a condition which must be fulfilled before any con-
tract is concluded at all. In those cases the stipulation 'subject
to the opening of a letter of credit' is rather like a stipulation
'subject to the contract.' If no credit is provided, there is no
BENJAMIN'S SALES OF GOODS, supra note 30, § 2170, which states that the cases do not lay
down a conclusive rule either in the case of f.o.b. contracts (see infra note 61) or in the
case of c.i.f. contracts:
A documentary credit furnished at a reasonable time before the commence-
ment of the shipping period enables him to prepare the goods for punctual ship-
ment. He can also use the credit in order to furnish, right at the beginning of the
shipping period, a back-to-back credit in favour of an ultimate supplier of the
goods.
Id.
60. Id. § 1751.
61. Id. § 1863. The meaning of f.o.b. is free on board at some location, such as f.o.b.
shipping point or f.o.b. destination. The invoice price includes delivery at the seller's
expense to that designated location. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 578 (5th ed. 1979).
62. See BENJAMIN'S SALES OF GOODS, supra note 30, § 1863. In fact, Benjamin notes
that "the rate is not utterly inflexible ...... Id.
63. [1952] 1 All E.R. 970.
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contract between the parties. In other cases a contract is con-
cluded and the stipulation for a credit is a condition which is
an essential term of the contract. In those cases the provision
of the credit is a condition precedent, not to the formation of a
contract, but to the obligation of the seller to deliver the goods.
If the buyer fails to provide the credit, the seller can treat him-
self as discharged from any further performance of the con-
tract ..
The facts in A.E. Lindsay & Co., Ltd. v. Cook" involved a buyer's
failure to satisfy what was characterized as an implied condition prece-
dent to the contract. A seller in Australia contracted to sell frozen
chickens to a buyer in England.6 Delivery was to be made by a ship
due to sail on September 28, 1951.67 Payment was to be made by
credit, to be opened "immediately" in favor of the seller at the Rural
Bank of Sydney.68 Although the buyer instructed his bank to open the
credit with the Rural Bank on September 24, the credit was not
opened until October 6.69 By that time the ship had already set sail
without the buyer's shipment. The buyer sued for damages due to non-
delivery. Although the court voiced its sympathy toward the plaintiffs,
who did their best to open the credit but failed to do so because of an
"unfortunate conjunction of circumstances," it held that it was an im-
plied condition precedent to the contract that the buyer would open
the credit before the seller shipped the goods.7 0 The court found that
the condition precedent was not satisfied, as a result of which the seller
repudiated the contract and sold the chickens to a third party. The
court reasoned that "[iut is quite clear ... that the defendant was enti-
tled to do what he did.
7 1
The rule applied in A.E. Lindsay & Co. has implicitly controlled
later decisions, including those where the buyer's delay in opening the
letter of credit was characterized merely as a failure to satisfy a condi-
64. Id. at 976. Lord Denning further noted that he regarded "the provision of a credit
as different from the payment of money and not subject to the special rules ... relating
thereto." Id. at 977.
65. [1953] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 328.
66. Id. at 331.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The Rural Bank was not known to buyer's bank, which instead opened the
credit with the New South Wales Bank in Sydney. The New South Wales Bank was
then, according to its contract with buyer's bank, required to open the credit at Rural
Bank. The credit, however, was not opened at the New South Wales Bank until Septem-
ber 28, and the Rural Bank was not notified until October r. Id. at 332.
70. Id. at 335.
71. Id.
[Vol. 6
AVOIDANCE IN INTERNATIONAL SALES
tion precedent to delivery of the goods. In Etablissements Chainbaux
S.A.R.L. v. Harbormaster, Ltd.,7 the buyer sued the seller for failing
to deliver the goods. The court determined that: "[t]he furnishing of a
letter of credit was a condition precedent to the delivery of the goods,
and therefore prima facie if they want to establish the breach of deliv-
ering the goods they must allege that they have fulfilled the necessary
condition precedent, that they have furnished the letter of credit.
'T3
The contract indicated that the buyer was to open the credit within a
few weeks. 4 The court estimated a reasonable time therefrom and held
that since the buyer had not opened the letter of credit within that
time the sellers were justified in canceling the contract.7 5
In Enrico Furst & Co. v. W.E. Fischer, Ltd.,7 one of the issues
raised was whether the buyer's breach of his obligation to open the
letter of credit within the time agreed upon was waived by the seller.
With regard to this issue, the court stated:
If by his conduct the seller leads the buyer to suppose, and to
act upon the supposition, that he, the seller, will not insist
upon the opening of the credit within the specified time, he
waives his right to treat the failure to open the credit within
the specified time as a breach of condition entitling him to re-
pudiate the contract but he does not thereby waive his right to
have the credit of the particular kind opened within a reasona-
ble time, and to treat failure to open it as a breach of condition
if it is not opened in a reasonable time.77
D. English Law in Comparison with the Convention
As noted above, four types of cases relevant to this inquiry arise
under English law. Each group offers guidance in refining the Conven-
tion's definition of fundamental breach in article 25 7 and the right to
the remedy provided in article 64(l)(a)79 of the Convention.
Freedom of contract is the prevailing principle under both English
law and the Convention."0 Thus, merchants can, in most circumstances,
explicitly provide for their rights and remedies in the event of a breach
72. [1955] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 303.
73. Id. at 310.
74. Id. at 311.
75. Id.
76. [1960] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 340.
77. Id. at 345.
78. Convention, supra note 1, art. 25.
79. Id. art. 25.
80. Convention, supra note 1, art. 6.
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of the contract. Additionally, the English Sale of Goods Act and En-
glish common law remedies reflect the same basic ideas that underlie
the definition of fundamental breach in article 25.81 Under both laws,
three factors appear determinative of whether the breach is fundamen-
tal or not: the perishability of the goods; whether the buyer repeatedly
fails to pay on seller's demand; and whether the buyer is given a rea-
sonable time.82 Thus, in these cases, determining if and when a seller
may avoid the contract is particularly dependent on the configuration
of facts presented by the individual case.8 3
The cases under English law, where a right to terminate arises as a
result of the buyer's failure to comply with contract provisions as to
method of payment, however, do not fit into this system of case by case
judgments." A "per se" rule of fundamental breach is applied to the
cases that fall within this group. 5 Any breach as to the opening of a
letter of credit (or the establishment of a bank guarantee) is in itself so
important that it gives the seller the right to cancel the contract, or in
the words of the Convention, any such breach is "fundamental."86 The
Convention's language, however, does not provide the seller with an
automatic right to rescind in these circumstances. 87 In fact, article 54
of the Convention obligates the buyer to pay the price and complete
the "steps" and "formalities" required to enable payment to be made,
and thus clarifies that there should not be a specific, independent ap-
proach to these steps and formalities.8 ' Of course, there might also be
cases under the Convention where any delay in establishing a letter of
credit will be considered a fundamental breach, but then the judgment
will be based upon the terms of the contract and the factual situation
of the case, and not on a per se rule.
81. Id. art. 25.
82. See supra notes 36-77 and accompanying text. See also BENJAMIN'S SALES OF
GOODS, supra note 30, §§ 1231-1256 (discussing fundamental breach as defined by En-
glish common law and also reviewing the statutory remedy under the Sale of Goods Act);
J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES § 185 (1982); PARKER SCH. OF FOR-
EIGN & COMP. LAW OF COLUM. U. INT'L SALES: THE U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS § 9.03(d) (1984) [hereinafter cited. as PARKER
SCHOOL].
83. See generally supra note 82.
84. See BENJAMIN'S SALES OF GOODS, supra note 30, § 1751 (1981).
85. Id.
86. Convention, supra note 1, art. 25.
87. Id. art. 54.
88. J.HONNOLD, supra note 86, § 323: "The failure to take one of the required steps
'to enable payment to be made' itself constitutes a breach of contract." Id. See also
PARKER SCHOOL, supra note 82, § 7.02.
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III. THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. In General
The Uniform Sales Act, in section 65, the precursor to the Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.), stated: "where the goods have not
been delivered to the buyer, and the buyer has.. . committed a mate-
rial breach [of the contract), the seller may totally rescind the contract
or the sale."89
The question of "whether a breach [was] material or substantial
[under § 65 depended] on the terms of the contract and on the facts
and circumstances of the case." 0 The terms of the contract stated, e.g.,
whether or not time was of the essence. If payment was to be made in
advance or concurrent with delivery, it was inferred that time was of
the essence in the contract. If, however, the sale was on credit the op-
posite inference was taken.
The U.C.C. provides that payment is due in accordance with the
contract, or otherwise at the time of delivery.01 If payment is due on or
before delivery, and the buyer fails to make the payment when due,
the remedies afforded the seller are stated in Section 2-703." Section
89. Uniform Sales Act § 65, 1A U.L.A. 233 (1950).
90. 77 C.J.S. Sales § 233 (1952).
91. U.C.C. § 2-301 (1983) states: "The obligation of the seller is to transfer and de-
liver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract." Id. § 2-
310 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed
(a) payment is due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive
the goods even though the place of shipment is the place of delivery;
and
(b) if the seller is authorized to send the goods he may ship them under
reservation, and may tender the documents of title, but the buyer may
inspect the goods after their arrival before payment is due unless such
inspection is inconsistent with the terms of the contract (Section 2-
513); and
(c) if delivery is authorized and made by way of documents of title other-
wise than by subsection (b) then payment is due at the time and place
at which the buyer is to receive the documents regardless of where the
goods are to be received; and
(d) where the seller is required or authorized to ship the goods on credit
the credit period runs from the time of shipment but post-dating the
invoice or delaying the starting of the credit period.
Id.
92. Id. § 2-703 provides:
Where the buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails
to make a payment due on or before delivery or repudiates with respect to a part
or the whole, then with respect to any goods directly affected and, if the breach
is of the whole contract (Section 2-612), then also with respect to the whole un-
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2-703 states that failure to make payment includes the dishonor of a
check, the nonacceptance of a draft and the failure to furnish an
agreed upon letter of credit.93 The section further states that: "[w]here
the buyer . . fails to make a payment due on or before delivery," the
seller may, among other remedies, re-sell the goods or cancel the con-
tract.94 Hence, it seems as if the seller would have an absolute right to
re-sell or cancel, independent of whether the breach is material. Noth-
ing in the comment to the U.C.C., however, indicates that such a radi-
cal change in the law was intended. One commentator has observed,
"the mere fact that section 2-703 states that the seller may cancel, in
absolute terms, would be immaterial and really ineffective to provide
any substantive right."'95
The question of materiality was dealt with in Nora Springs Coop-
erative v. Braudau,9' where the alleged breach was the buyer's nonac-
ceptance of delivery. One of the buyer's defenses was that the breach
was too insubstantial to give the seller the right to cancel the con-
tract. 7 The court stated that under U.C.C. 2-703(f):
where the buyer breaches the contract the aggrieved seller may
"cancel." "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end
to the contract for breach by the other. Nothing is mentioned
about materiality of the breach as argued by [the buyer].
Thus, when read together with [1-1061 which mandates that
remedies are to be "liberally administered to the end that the
aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party has fully performed," we might very well hold that mate-
riality need not be shown to warrant cancellation .... "
However, even if, arguendo, materiality is a requirement for can-
cellation under the theory that the general principles of law merchant
delivered balance, the aggrieved seller may
(a) withhold delivery of such goods;
(b) stop delivery by any bailee as hereinafter provided (Section 2-705);
(c) proceed under the next section respecting goods still unidentified to
the contract;
(d) resell and recover damages as hereafter provided (Section 2-706);
(e) recover damages for nonacceptance (Section 2-708) or in a proper case
the price (Section 2-709);
(f) cancel
93. Id. comment 3.
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
95. [3A Sales & Bulk Transfers] U.C.C. Serv. (Bender) § 13.02, at 1 (1984).
96. 247 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1976).
97. Id. at 747.
98. Id. at 749.
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supplement the specific provisions of the [U.C.C.] section [1-103], [the
buyer's] contention is still unconvincing.
The decisions in Mott Equity Elevator v. Svihovecs9 and Ziebarth
v. Kalenze'00 are in accord with this theory. Both cases involve the
buyer's non-acceptance of delivery of the goods. In Mott, the court
held that "the buyer breached the agreement in not accepting delivery
within a reasonable time, giving rise to [the seller's] right to cancel
under [2-703]. 01 In Ziebarth, the court reaffirmed this reasoning and
held that the buyer "breached the agreement by not picking up [the.
goods] within a reasonable time.'" ' 2
The reasoning in these cases, which define breach as the buyer's
nonacceptance of delivery within a reasonable time, clearly indicates
that the court incorporated a material breach requirement into section
2-703(f).
Since, as a practical matter, resale and cancellation have the same
effect on a contract, it is also helpful to review cases involving resale
upon a buyer's failure to pay the price. In Mott, the court said: "[tihe
only condition precedent to the seller's right to resell is a breach by the
buyer within section 2-703."' ° The same rule is expressed in other de-
cisions.' "4 The result in Mott and its successors cannot, however, have
been intended by the legislators. The comment to section 2-703 specifi-
cally states that the article rejects any doctrine of election of remedy,
and that the remedies in the section are cumulative. 0 5 Consequently, it
would be quite possible for a seller, in the case of a buyer's failure to
pay, to first cancel the contract and then resell the goods and recover
damages. If that were the case, then a material breach would be re-
quired in order to cancel the contract, whereas any breach would jus-
tify a resale of the goods under the same contract. Clearly, this result
could not have been intended. If the requirement for cancellation is a
99. 236 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1975).
100. 238 N.W.2d 261 (N.D. 1976).
101. 236 N.W.2d at 909 [emphasis added].
102. 238 N.W.2d at 269 [emphasis added].
103. 236 N.W.2d at 908.
104. See, e.g., Desbien v. Penokee Farm Union, 220 Kan. 358, 552 P.2d 917 (1976);
Clock v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad, 407 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
105. U.C.C. § 2-703 (1983) (comment 1):
This section ... gathers together in one convenient place all of the various
remedies open to a seller for any breach by the buyer. This Article rejects any
doctrine of election of remedy as a fundamental policy and thus the remedies are
essentially cumulative in nature and include all of the available remedies for
breach. Whether the pursuit of one remedy bars another depends entirely on the
facts of the individual case.
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material breach, then in order to justify a resale the breach would also
have to be material.
B. The U.C.C. in Comparison with the Convention
It is not clear whether the Convention's concept of fundamental
breach is interchangeable with the U.C.C.'s definition of material
breach. As mentioned previously, the Convention's definition of funda-
mental breach is interpreted of late in a more objective manner. The
U.C.C. does not make certain whether a material breach is always re-
quired and, if so, whether the materiality of the breach is meant to be
a subjective standard. Some courts have interpreted a materiality re-
quirement into U.C.C. section 2-703; those decisions are the only avail-
able evidence of the standards used in applying the requirement. Un-
fortunately, these decisions do not clarify whether an objective or
subjective standard governs under the Code. If subjective criteria de-
termine whether a material breach has occurred, it may be impossible
to use cases arising under the Code as guidance for the interpretation




The Swedish Sale of Goods Act of 1905106 was prepared in consul-
tation with Denmark and Norway; these countries enacted sales acts
nearly identical to Sweden's shortly after promulgation of the Swedish
Act.10 7 Hence, the following analysis can be analogously applied to all
three countries.
Section 28 of the Swedish Act states in part:
Where the price is not paid in due time or the buyer fails to
take a measure on which the payment of the price depends, the
seller may, at his option, avoid the contract of purchase or de-
mand its performance; if the delay is insignificant, the
purchase may not be repudiated, unless it is a commercial
sale.108
The applicability of the section is limited to cases where the goods are
106. Swedish Sale of Goods Act of 1905, 1961-62 INT'L INST. FOR UNIFICATION OF PRI-
VATz LAvw, UNITICATION o LAw Y.B. 203 (UNIDROIT).
107. Id. at 203 n.1.
108. Id. § 28.
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not yet in the buyer's possession.""9
The scope of the provision encompasses not only cash payments,
but "measure(s] on which the payment of the price depends."110 These
measures might include, for example, the acceptance of a draft or the
issuance of a letter of credit."' The seller's right under section 28 is
also limited by the requirement that the delay must be significant, un-
less the sale is a commercial sale (i.e., between two merchants)." 2 In a
commercial sale or trade purchase, any delay entitles the seller to avoid
the contract. 1 3 According to the commentary, in commercial trade
even an insignificant delay of payment is of great importance.""
"Thus, [a] seller may ... lawfully discharge himself from further per-
formance under the contract even if payment is tendered the day after
it is due."'' 5
Today, this absolute right of the seller is considered too harsh. In
a draft for a new Swedish Sale of Goods Act (the Draft)," 6 "the seller
[may] declare the contract avoided if the breach is 'fundamental' but
not, as under the present Act, [for] any delay in a commercial sale.""' 7
As an exception to this provision, the Draft presents another "new"
rule. When the buyer is obliged to pay against documents representing
the goods, the seller may declare the contract avoided even though the
breach is not fundamental."' "This rule follows commercial
practice."'9
Even though the Draft has not yet led to legislation, there is no
reason to neglect these "new influences" in Swedish law. Rather, one
might assume that these new rules will be kept intact, especially since
they reflect modern commercial practice.2 0 If this assumption is cor-
rect, Swedish sale of goods law will provide that the buyer's delay in
109. Id. Paragraph 2 of § 28 reads: "After the goods have come into the buyer's pos-
session, the seller is not entitled to repudiate the purchase ... unless he has reserved his
right to do so or the buyer has rejected the goods." Id.
110. Id.
111. See generally notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
112. Swedish Sale of Goods Act, art. 28. As defined by the Swedish Act, a "trade
purchase" is a purchase "concluded between merchants in the course of their trade." Id.
art. 3.
113. Id. art. 28.
114. Almen, Om K8p och byte av 16s egendom, 1960 P.A. NORSTFDTS OCH S8NERS
FORLAG 402.
115. Id. at 402.
116. Koplag. Slutbet~inkande av K~plagsutredningen. 1976:66, § 6.3.3.
117. Hellner, The Draft to a New Swedish Sale of Goods Act, in 1978 SCANDINAVIAN
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payment must be significant or fundamental in order to entitle the
seller to avoid the contract. In the application of such a rule, case law
and other authorities concerning noncommercial sales contracts under
section 28 may be helpful, because traditionally only a material breach
by a noncommercial buyer would entitle a seller to avoid the
contract. 21
Section 28 provides that the delay is to be considered from the
seller's perspective.2 2 The commentary stresses that the judgment
should be made as to the effect of the breach "in concreto.' 2 3 Accord-
ing to the commentary, primary considerations are the length of the
delay and whether the seller made any demand of payment or other
indicia of the necessity of prompt payment."2 '
Two Norwegian cases have turned on whether the buyer's breach
was fundamental. In N.R.T. 1921 s. 513,125 the court emphasized the
type of goods (shares of stock) and the seller's continued demand for
payment as important factors giving the seller the right to avoid the
contract. In N.R.T. 1925 s. 566,126 where the court also held the delay
significant, the length of the delay, the buyer's knowledge of the im-
portance of timeliness and the seller's interest in closing the contract
were determinative factors in the decision.
B. Swedish Law in Comparison with the Convention
Currently, Swedish law provides that any delay in a commercial
sale entitles the seller to avoid the contract. 127 This, of course, differs
greatly from the rule of the Convention.12 s As pointed out above, how-
ever, this is a Swedish regulation born at the beginning of the century,
and hence the difference is more the result of archaic legislation than
an intended approach toward this type of buyer's breach.2 9
Apart from the exception for payment against documents, the
rules in the Draft largely follow the Convention as to materiality under
section 28. The commentary suggests that the issue should be deter-
mined according to subjective criteria. The case law indicates as deter-
minative the length of the delay, the seller's demand or other indica-
121. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
122. Bengtsson, Havningsratt och uppsagningsratt vid Kontraktsbrott, 1967 P.A.
NORSTEDTS OCH S8NERS FORLAG 270.
123. Almen, supra note 114, at 402.
124. Id. at 139.
125. See Bengtsson, supra note 122, at 270.
126. Id. Hellner, supra note 117, at 69.
127. See supra notes 108 & 114-15 and accompanying text.
128. See Convention, supra note 1, arts. 25 & 64.
129. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
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tions that time is of the essence, and the type of goods involved. These
factors may also be of great importance in decisions under article 25 of
the Convention. However, due to the subjective approach under section
28, the potential influence Swedish law could have on the development
of a working definition of fundamental breach under the Convention
may be vastly diluted.
V. STANDARD CONTRACTS
A review and appraisal of domestic legal decisions and laws is
helpful in interpreting article 25 of the Convention; it gives the concept
of fundamental breach a more practical meaning. Guidelines deduced
from this appraisal indicate the specific factors which national courts
have emphasized as important to their decisions.
Another way of approaching the problem is to study provisions in
contracts normally used in international sales. The Convention gives
legal effect to commercial usages and practices. Under article 9(2) cus-
tomary usages are read into the contract. 3 ' The usage must be one "of
which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in interna-
tional trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to
contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned."''
If the standard contracts3 2 used in international trade fulfill the
requirements of article 9(2)1 then these contracts may be helpful in
defining "fundamental breach" as used in the Convention. Of course, a
provision in a standard contract does not in itself establish "a usage,"
but it does provide a strong indication of custom and usage. Moreover,
even if the provision (or the contract) is such that it does not meet the
required standards for "a usage," it is still possible that a court would
take it into consideration when determining whether the buyer's delay
was reasonable. In addition, comparison of standard contracts indi-
cates how merchants treat delays by a buyer and how such treatment
differs with the type of transaction and goods which are sold.
Following are a few examples of provisions in standard contracts
concerning this issue. The ECE General Conditions for the Supply of
Plant and Machinery for Export (No. 188) states at article 8.7: "if at
the end of the period fixed in paragraph F of the Appendix, the Pur-
chasers still have failed to pay the sum due, the Vendor shall be enti-
130. Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(2).
131. Id.
132. These agreements are normally drafted by an international organization (such as
the United Nations), an organization of sellers in the same field or by a seller with sub-
stantial sales.
133. Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(2).
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tied by notice in writing to the Purchaser, and without requiring the
consent of any court, to terminate the contract. .... ,,13 Paragraph F of
the appendix allows the parties to state the "period of delay in pay-
ment authorizing termination of vendor [in] . . .months.' ' 35
The ECE General Conditions for the Supply and Erection of Plant
and Machinery for Import and Export (No. 188A) 36 are similar to the
provision in No. 188.137 The period of delay, however, is set at three
months.13 8
Both of these contracts allow the buyer a long period of delay
before the seller may cancel."3 9 This is, of course, due to the type of
goods and kind of transaction concerned. Undoubtedly, this could be
used as a guideline for a court in its interpretation of fundamental
breach in article 25.
Conversely, when a transaction involves perishable goods, the pe-
riod of permissible delay is shorter. Article 56 of the ECE General Con-
ditions for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables Including Citrus Fruits, for in-
stance, states:
failure to comply with the payment clauses contained in the
contract shall give the seller the right to serve notice on the
purchaser calling upon him to make payment within 24 hours,
and notifying him that at the end of such period he reserves
the right to suspend subsequent deliveries or to terminate the
contract .... 140
Moreover, article 44(i) of the ECE General Conditions for Dry and
Dried Fruits advises:
If the documents are not taken up by the buyer within the pre-
scribed time limit [24 hours following the presentation of the
invoice or the documents], the seller shall be entitled, after giv-
ing notice within the two working days following the expiry of
the said time limit, to terminate the contract . .. .""
134. U.N./ECE General Conditions for the Supply of Plant and Machinery for Ex-
port, 1953 ECON. COMMISSION EURO. No. 188, U.N. Doc. E/ECEIME88.
135. Id.
136. U.N./ECE General Conditions for the Supply and Erection of Plant and Ma-
chinery for Import and Export, No. 188A, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/ME/188A (1957).
137. Id. appendix, para. F. See also ECE No. 188, supra note 134, para. F.
138. See supra note 136, appendix, para. F.
139. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
140. U.N./ECE General Conditions for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables Including Citrus
Fruit, U.N. Doc. ECE (1979).
141. U.N./ECE General Conditions of Sale for Dry (Shelled and Unshelled) and
Dried Fruit, U.N. Doc. ECE/AGRI/41 at 23 (1979). The General Conditions of Sale re-
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Furthermore, the ECE General Conditions for Potatoes declares in
article 47(i):
any delay in payment, non-payment or failure to open a bank
credit by the date specified in the contract shall entitle the
seller to call upon the buyer to perform his obligation within
three working days after receipt of the communication from
the seller, warning him that, on the expiry of the time limit,
the seller may suspend deliveries or terminate the contract.14
2
It should be noted that in none of these three provisions is any
delay, per se, a breach entitling the seller to avoid the contract. Even
when the goods are of such a perishable nature as fresh fruit, the buyer
is permitted twenty-four hours to tender payment. 143
The CMEA General Conditions provide in sections 67(2) & (3):
"The seller shall be obliged to give the buyer additional time to open a
letter of credit ... If the buyer fails to open the letter of credit even
within the additional time, the seller shall have the right to cancel the
contract.
'1 4 4
This provision is close to a requirement of fundamental breach.
The requirement that the seller must give the buyer additional time is
another way of saying that not just any delay is enough to give the
seller the right to cancel the contract. The difference is that, under the
CMEA provision, additional time must always be granted, whereas
under article 25, at least theoretically, any delay might be a fundamen-
tal breach.1 45
Article 24 of General Contract (No. 1) of the Grain and Feed
Trade Association provides: "[iun default of fulfillment of contract by
either party, the other, at his discretion, shall, after giving notice by
letter, telegram, or telex, have the right to sell or purchase as the case
ferred to herein for various agricultural products are prepared by "the Group of Experts
on International Trade Practices Relating to Agricultural Products, a subsidiary organ of
the Working Party on Standardization of Perishable Produce, which is itself a subsidiary
body of the Committee on Agricultural Problems of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe." Id. at 1.
142. U.N./ECE General Conditions of Sale for Potatoes, U.N. Doc. ECE/AGRI/42 at
28 (1980).
143. See U.N./ECE General Conditions for Fresh Fruit, supra note 140.
144. U.N./ECE General Conditions of Delivery of Goods Between Organizations of
the Member Countries of the Counsel for Mutual Economic Assistance, U.N. Doc. ECE
(1968).
145. Convention, supra note 1. Article 25 does not require additional time to be given
to the buyer, but only that the three criteria be met. See supra note 21 and accompany-
ing text.
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may be, against the defaulter . "14... I' This right to resell the goods
affords the seller the same practical result as if he had a right to cancel
the contract. Resale, however, must be preceded by notification to the
buyer by letter, telegram or telex.1" This provision grants the seller a
surprisingly extensive right, as the mere transmittal of a telex is a sim-
ple procedure. Thus, this provision provides the seller with nearly an
absolute right to resell.
The Official Contract Form for Hide and Skin Sellers and Tanners
provides in article 12:
if the buyer fails to make payment in accordance with the
terms laid down in this contract and such failure is fairly at-
tributable to government restrictions imposed after the signing
of this contract, the seller may, at any time before tender of
payment in full by the buyer, and after giving seven days' no-
tice to the buyer, cancel this contract .... 14
Under this contract, the seller's right to cancel because of nonpayment
is limited to cases where the failure to pay is due to governmental re-
strictions imposed after the signing of the contract.
The governmental restrictions provision raises another issue. Sup-
pose that such a restriction of the seller's right would be a usage cov-
ered by article 9(2).149 The restriction is then applicable to the contract
and prohibits the seller from canceling when the delay of payment oc-
curs for any reason other than governmental restrictions. If, however,
the delay is not due to governmental restrictions, whether the require-
ments of article 25 would require a fundamental breach is unclear. In
this case the situation is governed by both usage-not entitling the
seller to cancel-and article 25-entitling avoidance. The usage
prevails here, however, since it is impliedly made applicable to the con-
tract (article 9(2)) and under article 6 the parties are permitted to der-
ogate from the provisions of the Convention. 50
146. The Grain and Feed Trade Association, General Contract No. 1 (Aug. 1, 1976)
(available at Baltic Exchange Chambers, 28 St. Mary Ave., London, EC3A 8EF).
147. Id.
148. The International Counsel of Hide and Skin Sellers Associations and the Inter-
national Council of Tanners, Official Contract Form No. 5 (1973).
149. Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(2).
150. J. HONNOLD, supra note 20, at 149. Articles 9(2) and 6 provide that a party may
derogate from the provisions of the Convention. See supra notes 9, 79, 130, 133, 149 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these provisions.
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CONCLUSION
The basic rule of the Convention, that a seller may avoid the con-
tract if the buyer's breach amounts to a fundamental breach, has its
counterpart in the legal systems of England, the United States and
Sweden. Although the basic rule is the same, the differences in com-
mercial practice and behavior are influential for each nation's interpre-
tation of fundamental breach under article 25. The major factor the
courts of England, the United States and Sweden have considered in
determining whether a breach is fundamental (material or significant)
is the length of the delay. But the length of the delay is not meaningful
until the reasonableness of the delay is established. Reasonableness, in
turn, depends upon other factual circumstances.
Both English and Scandinavian courts have emphasized the im-
portance of the type of goods concerned. In a transaction involving
goods, such as shares of stock or codfish, the buyer will be required to
meet his obligations expeditiously. Moreover, English law provides that
repeated failure by the buyer to pay on demand might give the seller
an immediate right of cancellation. Even when this rule is not applied,
the seller, by repeating his demand for payment or by otherwise show-
ing the buyer that time is of the essence, can shorten the payment pe-
riod to the extent a court will deem reasonable.
Finally, standard commercial contracts also clearly indicate how
time periods differ depending on the goods sold under the agreement.
In the case of perishable goods, the seller may avoid the contract after
a twenty-four hour delay; the time period for a seller of plants and
machinery could be months or years.
While the determination of whether a breach is fundamental will
be decided on a case by case basis, depending on the factual circum-
stances, domestic and private law consistently recognize as important
certain factors. Given the ambiguity in article 25 and the international
community's interest in promoting commercial stability, courts should
consider these general norms in interpreting and applying article 25 of
the Convention.
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